Introduction
This paper combines a combinatorial study with Ihe application of its results to the analysis of a cryptological question. (The combinatorial problem is fully defined and solved in Sec. 2.)
The firs( step was takent by (oldwassvr Mlicahl is (:! + ()-secure, where ( is fixed and arbitrary slalall. Thei r paper jI 3( S1 con Ia ili a in algoritli ii which inverts the USA fu nition. Their algori thm i uses ;I t )-or;Ic For ItSA's l.s.b (in order) to dJetermine the parities of' certain mulIt iples of t he original message. For f'urther djetails consult, I CS] or [VV2].
Vaziraiai arid Vazirani [VV 1] have presented a very sophist icatIed maodi ficatiloll of the algorithmic procedure used by lien-Or, Chor and Shamnir. 'The flienie of' their mlodlificat ion is a much bet ter usc of' the oracle answers. Thiey showed t hat their modificat ion is guaranteed to succeed when given access to :I 0.711 -oracle for I? ..\'s l.s.b. Rlecently, they have imiproved their analysis by showing that their mnodificat ion is guaranteed to succeed even if it uses a 0.732-oracle.
Using the comibinatorial results obtained in this paper, we show that the Vazirani arid Vazirani algorithmn is guaranteed to succeed when it uses a 0.725-oracle for IZSA's l.s.b. Other observations w.r.t the Vazirani and Vazirani algorithm as well as w.r.t other inverting algorithms are also implied.
Our Results
The following problem occured to us when trying to improve Ben-Or, Char and Shamir's result [BCS]:
Let s be a n-bit string with m ones and nm zeros. Two bits in the string s are said to be t-close if they are within distance t apart. Denote by GF~f(s) the number of pairs of' equal t-close bits in the string s . What is the minimum value of CE&(), over all n-bit strings which consists of m ones and nm zeros?
In Sec.2 we prove a (reasonably) tight lower bound on this combinatorial problem. With respect to proving the "amount" of security of the least significant bit of the RSA, this is a double-edged -sword:
(1) It provides a powerful tool for analyzing certain algorithms for inverting the RSA using an ('+ b)-oracle for RSA's l.s.b.
For example the algorithm proposed by Vazirani and Vazirani [VVIJ is shown to work when it uses any 0.725-oracle for RSA's l.s.b (i.e. 6=0.225). This establishes the best result known conserning the security of RSA's l.s.b.
(2) It points out the weakness of various proof techniques for determining the cryptographic security of RSA's l.s.b.
For example the Vazirani and Vazirani algorithm [VVI] may fail to invert if it uses a " -oracle for RSA's l.s.b
Th.-implications will be discussed in Sec. 3 . We believe that the combinatorial result has ..lso other implications. In Oiis section we give a formal delinition of the comiinaltorial prol)lm, disci,. (,d iii the introdu ion, ain: rid prove a ( reasonably) tight lower boun( on it. sh,(s). The i-overlap of s will be drnoted by over,(s) , i.e.
2.A,. Delinitions

over,(s)
Il-arming(s =_sh 1 
(s))
where =_ denotes the bit by bit equal operation and Hamming(s) denotes the number of ones in s . Note that overi(s) = J{j: 0 < < 151 A sy = sji}[ • Denote by AverOver(s,t) the average over the i-overlaps of s for i E {1, 2, .., t}. I.e.
I t AverOver(s, t) = j over,(s)
We remind the reader that CEt(s) was used to denote the number of pairs, of equal bits which are within distance t apart, in the string s . I.e. CEt(s)
wheren = s
Clearly, CE(s)=EZtiI{j: 0 < j < n A S i = sj+i}l. Thus,
When evaluating CEt(s) consider "lines" which connect equal t-close bits in s (i.e. positions that contain equal values and are less than t bits apart in the string s). These lines are hereafter called overlines. Note that CEt(s) is nothing but the number of overlines in the string s.
Let n and m be integers such that 0.5n < m < n. Let 5 ---0. We denote by S, the set of n-bit binary strings with m=(0.5 + 6)n ones (and n -m zeros).
Denote by Aver(n.6,t) the minimum value of AverOver(.,t) divided by n, when minimized over all strings in S6. I.e. Aver(n,6,t)= min,es { -n -AverOver(s,t) }. a |It is straightforward to see that for every 8 E S6, AverOver(s,n)=(0.5 + 26 2 )n.
In this section we study Aver(n,b,t) for arbitrary t, t<n. We obtain non-trivial results, as the surprising fact that Aver(n,0,t) converges to r/2 -1 . 0.414 , when and t are large enough. 
P roposit ions
Wv will assiitC throughout thi., ection that / I -2 ich ( /') , ti t .Avvr(n.,b.1).
tedticti
into ;I restrict 'd sibst, Iii thi,, llbs.,t'ctio e will shoI w that whtri ;ir il:suuiig r A e t :.!) it is crioitih to cotsider strings it SI \%iich |Im\v the folowilitg lrolucrty:
The siring contains io "short l+ternat otions suhstriig".
substrIng is a su bst ring of the Forim a r ' arid Iigh II less th n t t 2. %% here Sr 7 {_ 10, I}. ( lere, and throughou t this paper, Ca denotes i rion-eiopty trillg of o's.
Proposition 1: over,(s) = over,(shi(s))
Prop. I follows directly from the definitions which consider strings as if they were cycles. From this point (n, we also take the liberty of doing so. 
. proof: Note that the difference between n ,T and n,,,, is only due to the existence or non-existence of overlines between al and r and between r 2 and a.,,, . Details are left to the reader.
'2' ,I Note that switching rl and r 2 in the string (710r2 . .. ro results in the string altc2 .*.Ut 2 r.OtTtTj U ..
The latter string has more overlines (than the former one) only if a 1 i2 r 1 a,,. Note that the latter string has less overlines if a = 7 1 " r 2 = U2,.n Proposition 3: Let a be a binary string and let z, y, z, u be integers such that z + y > t but y + z < t. Then: in ar'Or'a"rti "'ao which is t bits to the right of "the switched a" is also a a.) Part (iii) follows by z sequential applications of part (i). Case 2 (0 < z < t): Let aT. and ale be the bits adjacent to a in the string s. Replacing alaj?
by ar.O I trail in the string s results in a string s'. Note thMit the numnber of overlines within arl, acl is equal to the number of overlines within rlO 2 l t 1' a.
Also note that the number of' overlines between the 0 Z 1 t '-block and the rest of s, (excluding /, and a,?) is at most t(t -1). Thus, CEt(s') < CE,(s) i(t -1) and
the proposition follows.
Qcd
Proposition 5: Let s' G S' be a string, with minimum nurnbxr of overlines, which satisfies Prop. 4 .Then with no loss of generality, the string s' contains no substring of the form 10' 1 * 0 the length of which is less than t + 2. Furthermore, the string s' contains at most one substring of the form 01 '0* I the length of which is less than t + 2.
We remind the reader that CEt(s') < ntAver(n,6,t)+t 2 and that s'E S n . proof: By the hypothesis, s' contains a substring of length at least t + 2 which has the form 10 1 I0. The following is a sketch of the proof:
Starting at such a substring and scanning s' cyclicly (from left to right) we apply switches to make sure that all scanned substrings of either the form 10' 1 ' 0 or the form 01 '0 are of length at least t + 2. We stop before scanning the last unscanned 01,0 1 substring. Noticing that the above process does not increase the number of overliries, we are done.
The proof proceeds as follows:
By Prop. 4 (,i, we can assume, w.l.o.g, thats' = IOliOa, where i+j > t and a E {0, 1}.
\e definc the following scanning procedure and apply it to s, --1=50z1J$Ok. ($$ denotes the "starting position" and $ denotes the "current position" in the scanning.)
" Vv r,,,ir,'i Ow rcmltr ti;at a7 de(lotv, a iioli-ellipty ,tring of am. Proposition 6: Let s' E S ' l be a string as in 'rop. 5. Then there exist a string S" E S, such that:
(i) The string s" contains no substring of the form 10 1 ' 0 the length of which is less than t + 2.
(ii) The string s" contains no substring of the form 01 0' 1 the length of which is less than t + 2.
proof: By the hypothesis s' has no 10 1 0 substring and at most one 01'0 1 substring of length less than t + 2. Assume that such a unique 01.10 1 substring of length less than t + 2 exists; i.e. y + z < t. ]eplace this substring in s' by the subktring 001l resulting in a string s". Note that s" satisfies both (i) and (ii). To conclude note that CEt(s") < CEt(s') + t 2 -t. [The number of overlines within 01Y01 is equal to tile number of ov'erlines within 00:111; the number of overlines between the 0 1l-block and the rest of s" is lest than t(t -1).] The proposition follows.
Qed
We remind the reader that our objective is to given a good lower bound on Aver(n,6,t)=min,(so, ,iCEt(s). Note that we have restricted our attention to strings that donot have short 3-alternations substrings; i.e. substrings of the form 01 '0 1 or 10' V 0 which have length less than t + 2. This is suflicient since there exist such a string, namely s", that has approximately the minimun number of overlines. I.e. CEt(s") < ntAver(n,6,t)+2t-. Formally we define R' to be the set of strings which belong to S, and do not have short 3-alternating substrings. Aver,1(n,6,t) will denote • ,t CEt(r). Clearly, Proposition 7: Aver(n,6 ,) Averd(n,6,t) < Aver(n,6,t) proof: By Prop. 4,5 and 6, s" E R and ntAveril(n,6,t) CEI(s") < CEt(s) + 2t 2 ,,' Aver(n,6,t)+2t ' 2 . Thus, the proposition follows.
Qrd
Let us define even a more restricted subset of Sb,: The set MR, is the subset of strings which belong to R', and do not. have long homngenous substrings; i.e. substring of Let us first give a tight lower bound on A'er ,lt(r,b ,t) and only later prove that this bound is :1pproxirnately also a hbound for Aver/?(ri,6,t).
Lower bound for Aver.%+ 1 ,(?,b,t)
Pecall that each of the strings in AWl?, C S' has the following properties:
(i) The string contains no short 3-alternating substrings.
(ii) The string cortains no long homogenous sutbstrings.
We will relay on tire above properties of the strings in A H , in order to bound ver t ,. ( n ,b,t) . Given a string r C-All?' we will introduce ain expression, for ( '1(r), %0hih depends only on the iuminbers of bits in each maximal substrings of con.secut.ive equal bits. In other words, we will introduce a localized counting of CE,3(r).
)elinition: We say that b is a block (an all-a block) of the string r if it is a maximal substring of equal bits. L.e. b = a' and r = rbra, where r a a and o is an arbitrary string.
Denotations: Let q denote the number of all-zero tall-one] blocks in r. Beginning from an arbitrary position between an all-one block and an all-zero block and going cyclically from left to right: number the blocks of consecutive zeros [ones] by 0,1,2,...,(q -1) . Denote by z, the number of zeros in the i-th all-zero-block and by yi the number of ones in the 2-th all-one-block. I.e., r = 1
Proposition 8: Overlines occur (in r) only either within a block or between two consecutive blocks (of the same bit).
proof: Consider any substring of the form 10+1+0'1 in r. By Prop. 6, the length of this substring exceeds t + I and therefore no overlines exist between the extreemn l's. Similiar observation holds for any 01* 0'1'0 substring. Thus, the proposition follows.
Qed
Remark: Note that Prop. 8 holds even if r E R.
This suggests to evaluate the number of overlines (in r) by counting the "contribution" of each (homogeneous) block to it. This counting is hereafter referred as the Block-Localized Counting (BLC) and proceeds as follows:
Block-Localized Counting (with respect to a block of length I in r):
(i) The number of overlines within the block, denoted It.
(ii) The number of overlines between bits of the blocks neighbouring this block (i.e the first block on its left and the first block on its right), denoted B 1 .
Note that 11 and BI are easy to evaluate and can be used to express CEt(r). Namely, Proposition 9: proor: Part (i) follows by observing that each overlin, is cOunflted exactly once.
To evaluate BI consider, w.l.o.g, the substring 0 0 ilOlk. if i + i < t then the number of overlines between the leftmost 0 and the O's to the right of It-block is f -(I + i). This is due to the fact that (by r E AfIt') 1 + k > t. Also note that if I / > I then there are no overlines between the leftmost 0 and the O's to the right of the 1t-block.
Clearly, for I < t + 1,-I, = (2). Thus, the proposition follows.
(2' d Remark: Note that for I > t, It (s) + (1 -t)t and fi = 0. (Note that for k 7 0,
) llowever such substrings donot exist in a string which belongs to MR'.
Evaluating It + BI we get
Proposition 10: The contribution (to the BLC) of one 1-bit long block (in r) is: 
1.
Note that g(.,.,...,.) is a quadratic form and therefore
Proposition 11: For fixed q, t and k, the minimum value of the function g(xopx,..,xq-i) subject to the constraint k -EI1oxi, is obtained at zO = x, q.,j, -V-l;-n and the minimum value, hb(qmin), is:
1+'-
Thus, Aver~,,t(n,6,t)> vi. All that is left is to derive a lower bound for Averit(n,6,t).
2.2.3.
Lower bound for Averu(n,6,t) and Aver(n,6,t)
In this subsection we show that a string, r 0 R, with minimum overlines can be transformed into a string r MR,,,, such that n' P-n, 6' -6 and CE(ro) , CEt(ro). We conclude by using this fact and the lower bound for Averjln(n,6,t), to introduce a lower bound for Averil(n,6,t).
Proposition 15: Let r 0 E R, ' be a string with minimum number of overlines; i.e. CEt(ro) = ntAver, 1 (n,6,t). Then:
(i) For a E {0, 1}, either ro contains no substring of more than t consecutive a's or r(l contains no block of less than t consecutive a's. Futhermore, w.l.o.g, ro contains atmost one substring of more than t consecutive o's.
(ii) If t > -then r 0 has no substring of the form o " a.
2
(iii) if t _ -_ then Aver(n,6,t)=26. Thus. part (i) of the proposition follows.
lv lProp. 13 and I4, Aver.i/u(n + k,6',t) > i, > 7it Hus, part (ii) follos.
Combining the above with Prop. 7, part (iii) follows.
Q d
The Main Results
Throughout this section we assume that + K t < 2(n-2).
Lower Bound Lemma: Aver(n,6,t) is at least proof: The L,emma follows from observing that the proof of the lower bound specifies the structure of a string which achieves minimum CEt(.) among all strings in AIR'. The only problem in constructing such a string is that non-integer numbers, of blocks and block sizes, may appear. However, we will show that the overlap added by (q -ko) f([z]) ) -(q f(z)). t.ii, (i -,),.
= z -I, get d,, = q((I -,,,)( -,',,)2 j ,,( --,,,, 
In ( \c coclude by rioting that t. th?,(fq,,,,,,]) t .,, ) 'h(q,,,,,, 
Additional Dcfinitions and Results
In this section we define a different, yet related, combinatorial problem. Instead of considering the average overlap over all "small"' shifts; we consider the maximum overlap obtained by one of the "small" shifts. This establishes a trivial lower bound on Max(nb,t). We donot beleive that this bound is tight; however we failed to prove a better one. On the other hand the following proposition yields an upper bound on Max(n,0,t). 
On t lie C'rylptograplhicSecurity of*tihe I?,SA'sI.S.1
in this section we apply the rv.,tiIs of t to' prix li , :,,ct i t Io tl, airt si., of' algorithms which invert the ISA 'iicryp)ion iim'ttion \ %iin give'ni ts, to an oracle for the least significant lit of the cicrvpt 'd in' :,;igv. Tli.s implies, rv,, .ll, (concetrning the security of RSA's I.s.b.) which fall inti) tie following three categorihs:
(i) A 0.725-security result (for RSA's I.s.b) (ii) Conditional inprovemients of thlie above result. I.e. results which will hold if soel conjecture is proven.
(iii) Bounds on the possibility of ilnproveiuiSnt using currcn itI ciniques.
Specific Background
Our 0.725-security result is based on Vazirani and Vazirani work [VVI], which is an improvement of Ben-Or Chor and Shamir [BCS] work. In this subsection we sketch some of the ideas used in these nice works.
A Sketch of Ben-Or Chor and Shamir Algorithmic Procedure
The essence of the Inverting Algorithm:
The plaintext is reconstructed , from its encryption, by running a g.c.d procedure on two multiples 7 of it. The values of these multiples (as well as the values of all multiples discussed hereafter) are "small" ' . A Modified Binary G.C.D algorithm is used. To operate, this algorithm needs to know the parity of multiples of the plaintext. Thus, it is provided with a subroutine that determines the parity of these multiples.
(see [BCS])
Determining Parity using an Oracle which may err:
The subroutine determines the parity of a multiple ,kx, of the plaintext ,z, by using an (I t 6 )-oracle for RSA's l.s.b as follows. It picks a random r and asks the oracle for the parity (i.e. i.s.b) of both rx and rx + kx feeding it in turn with E(rz) = E(r)E(x) and E((r + k)z) = E(r + k)E(x)g . The oracle's answers are processed according to the following observation. Since kx is "small" with very high probability rx < rz + kz . Then, the parity of kx is equel to 0 if the parities of rx and rx + kz are identical; and equal to I otherwise. This is repeated many times; every repetition (instance) is called a kx-measurement (or a toss of the kx-coin). Note that the outcome of a kx-measurement is correct if the oracle was correct on both rx and rx + kx . The outcome is correct also if the oracle was wrong on both queries (but this fact is not used in [BCS]).
All -. ,,t.gt , and opteration-4 are eot|sidered modulo ,N, the ISA's ,rodulus. hure and throtighioA thc rest of the paper "sNiall" means bounded by a very sminai fraction of the lISA'P inodtluhs. M' (mod N) 
Cryptographic Implications of our Combinatorial Results
It is easy to show that the Distinguishability Condition is equivalent to the following condition, hereafter referred to as the Big-Advantage Condition : for some fixed t, Max(N,6,t)> I -2b +c.
(Use oracle transformation through multiplication by the inverse of kX mod N. Note that if the inverse does not exist it is feasible to factor N and inverting thle RSA becomes easy.) This was also observed by Vazirani Note that the result. of corollary I i,, is tight. Th us tind(1er tlhe cond(itiion Aver(n,b,t) >I -2b + ( , the result. of' C orolary 2 is opt~iirial. I lowever.
A ver( n,6 ,t)> I -26 + ( s muore Ltall is needed to ,II 1,Y the lig-A .dVa it1age C('I I I ion.
(Recall that the Big-Ad vant age Con dition requires only that Max(n,b6t) >I -26 + (.)
Thus, any improvement of' the current lower b)oun~d oil Max( n,b I) will yield an improvement of the result of' Corollary 2. We beleive Ihat Max( n , J) > Aver(n,,6 ,/) and thus that such an itrprovement is possible. Furtheriiiore we conject ure that Note that under the Big-Advantage Condition the "result" of Corollary 3 is optimal. This is due to Prop. 1 9 (iZ?) which states that Max(n,b,t):5 1 + 6 . Thus, using the VV-Theorein (or any proof' technique which requires that the Big-Advantage Condition holds) one cannot hope to prove that RSA's l.s.b is a secure.
Let us concluide by pointing out that the full power of' the results obtained in section 2.3 was not used; however, we conjecture that it can be used. Namrely, Conjecture 2: Let N be the RSA's modulus and t < < N. If Aver(N,b,t The condition of the statement of' Conjecture 2 is hereafter referred to as the Average-Advantage Condition. By Corollary 1 (ii) , the Average-Advantage Condition is satisfied by 6 ==0.177; thus Corollary 4: If Conjecture 2 is valid then the RSA's l.s.b is 0.677-secure.
Note that 6 = 0.177 is the minimum for which the Average-Advantage Condition is satisfied. Thus no progress beyond the 6 =0.177 point can be made through the Average-Advantage Condition; i.e. when relying on it one cannot hope to prove that RSA's l.s.b is 0.676-secure.
Note that in Corollary 4 the missing part to reach the stated result is the algorithm that will use the analysis. (The analysis of the question which oracles satisfy the Avarage-Advantage Condition is complete!) However, in the case of the Big-Advantage Condition improved results can still be achieved (just) by improving the analysis of the combinatorial problem (see Corollary 3). a1 ('I.. (2) returr (scanning(ro -,r .)); , X kand yz < t] [transfer one T.] (3) return (scanning (c ou' ar1a$,
I, I yIi
Recall that s.+ra, is the argument by N\hich scanning is invoked in the first time. Let Thus, scanning(s.,,,,) satisfies the statement of Prop. 5.
